University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

Political Science, Department of

9-1986

Nationalism, Ethnocentrism and Personality by H. D. Forbes
William P. Kreml
University of South Carolina - Columbia, billkreml@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/poli_facpub
Part of the Political Science Commons

Publication Info
Published in American Political Science Review, Volume 80, Issue 3, 1986, pages 1004-1005.
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PSR
© 1986 by Cambridge University Press

This Book Review is brought to you by the Political Science, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

American Political Science Review Vol. 80
and economistslike Amartya Sen and Lester
Thurow.
ROBERTE. LANE

Yale University

Nationalism, Ethnocentrismand Personality.
By H. D. Forbes. (Chicago:Universityof
ChicagoPress, 1985. Pp. x + 219. $27.50.)
Since the writingof The AuthoritarianPersonality in 1950, a numberof attemptshave
been made to extend the principalthemes of
that classic work in a way that advances
politicalphilosophy. Forbes'swork is another
exampleof such a piece. Though the recognition of the theoretical potential of The
AuthoritarianPersonality (AP) is laudable,
Forbes unfortunatelyfails to add much of
substanceto its theoreticalthrust.
The reasons for Forbes's failure are
predominantly two-fold. The first is that
Forbesis wrestlingwith a massivecollectionof
dissertationdata (collectedin 1968)that unfortunately does not tap any significant theoreticalvein. The secondis Forbes'sown confusion concerningthe theoreticalstate of the AP
argument,as well as his confusion over why
critical theory, his attempted avenue to
theoreticaladvancement,is itself miredwithin
the ideological debate over the role of
psychology within politicaltheory.
With regardto the empiricaldifficultiesof
the work, Forbes'stwo hypothesesare:
1. Extreme nationalists are recruited
disproportionatelyfrom those with the
authoritarianstructureof personality;and
2. Differentnationalists'attitudesarestructured, or interrelated,in such a way as to
justify using the term "ethnocentrism"to
describe the attitudes of extreme nationalists.(p. 3)
His findings, the result of questionnairesadministered to French-speakingand Englishspeaking Canadian high school students, is
that there are differentkinds of nationalism.
Specifically, what Forbes finds is that
ethnocentrismis only found to correlatewith
nationalismin those circumstancesin which
the outgroup is clearly differentfrom the ingroup. At the least, such a finding is already
1004

implicitwithinAP; at most, it still does little to
advancepoliticalphilosophy.
The attemptto advancepoliticalphilosophy
beyond the findingsof Forbes'sstudy is even
more frustrating.Forbes, to his credit, does
understandthat AP is a clearoutgrowthof the
Frankfurtschool of thought that we know as
criticaltheory. He is awarethat works such as
AP are the result of a historicallyrooted admixture of Marx and Freud, and that the
writingsof Horkheimer,Fromm,Reich, and,
of course, Adorno himself all attempted to
deal with the psychological or, as it is frequentlycalled, the "early"periodof Marx.Yet
if Forbesgives such theoreticalsignificanceto
the criticalperspective,one must ask why the
almost paltry scope of the two hypothesesof
the book is not supplantedby morethanan occasional reference to critical theory. Within
193 pages of text, criticaltheory is abandoned
after page 15 until it is resurrectedon pages
145-148, and later on pages 189-193 (with the
ironic disclaimer that "noone familiar with
criticaltheory would lightheartedlyundertake
to plumbits depthsand reportthe resultsin a
page").
Even there, the "doctrine(or method) of
liberation"thatForbesfindsin criticaltheoryis
searchingfor a kind of "objectivity"that in
turn is the resultof internalcontradictionsbetween "objects"and "theclaimsmade on their
behalf" (p. 191). The difficulty with such a
theory of liberationis that it deals with only
the contradictionbetween reality and objective, betweenpromiseand performance.What
AP offers, which Forbesseems to have little
senseof but which othershave dealtwith quite
precisely(see, ChristianBay, The Structureof
Freedom,New York;Athenium, 1968) is that
perspectives upon reality differ widely between the authoritarianand the anti-authoritarian personality. Stated another way, the
latter-day questions surrounding AP have
dealt with relative subjectivities, not
objectivity.
There is now more than adequateevidence
that there are significantand testabledistinctions between psychologies that are highly
relevantto differentiationbetweenthe political
left and the political right. Such distinctions
are available not only within the work of
politicalscientistslike Bay, but also within the
work of cognitive psychologistslike Herman
Witkin, JosephRoyce, and HowardGardner.
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Sorel'spluralismto be anythingso elaborateor
developed.It is somethingmorelike a disposition than a theory, and must be definedin a
way suppleenough to embraceseveralpotentially separable things: conflicts between
disciplines, conceptual diversity within
disciplines, differencesbetween types of explanation, incommensurability,as well as a
sheer stubbornsense of the complexityof life
and
a hatredof the naive.
WILLiAMP. KREML
Whatis calledpluralismheremightpossibly
invite, the alternative label of dualism.
Universityof South Carolina
Dualism may of course be merely an impoverishedpluralism(or a monism manqu6)
Georges Sorel: The Characterand Develop- but it need not be, and thereseemsto be a difment of His Thought. By J. R. Jennings. ferencebetweenpositingan indefinitenumber
(New York:St. Martin'sPress,1985. Pp. xi of possiblepoints of view and insistingon ex+ 209. $25.00.)
haustive choices. Very often, Sorel does the
latter. He speaks of the artificial and the
J. R. Jennings'sstudy managesthe difficult natural,the insideand the outside,the abstract
task of combingintellectualbiographyand the and the concrete, the psychologicaland the
analysisof ideas. It is especiallygood at mak- scientific,and so on. Even his pluralisticdocing senseof the transitionsthatarenotoriously trineof communities(cites)of enquirerstends,
a featureof Sorel'sthinking.The book is com- effectively, to collapse, into a "polar"opposipact and clear, the proportionsof its discus- tion of scienceand religion(p. 11). It would be
sion judicious,and its scholarshipfaultless.It enormouslyinterestingto examinethe relation
is one of ratherfew works on Sorel that one between Sorel'sdispositionto pluralize,or to
could recommendto studentswithout fear of open questions to an indefinite number of
their being confused or misled: At the same answers, and his dispositionto dualize, or to
time, it is a sophisticatedwork (but unpreten- insist that answers of only two kinds can
tiously so) that one ought carefullyto consult count. It is among the many merits of
in doing researchon any of the diversetopicsit Jennings'sbook that it poses such constructive
discusses. It is one of severalrecentpieces of and far-reachingquestions.
evidence that Sorel scholarshipis at last being
RICHARDVERNON
given the imaginativetreatmentit deserves.
One Frenchcommentator(quoted by Jen- Universityof WesternOntario
nings) has said that Sorel'swriting "excluded
order, clarity, and, in general,all that would
make the assimilationof his ideaseasier."Jen- The Ivory Tower: Essaysin Philosophy and
nings himself elaborateson the difficulty of
Public Policy. By Anthony Kenny. (New
readingSorel'swork, referringto its sheerexYork and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.
tent and diversity,its frequentabstruseness,its
Pp. 137. $29.95, cloth.)
heterogeneityof level, and the volatilityof the
hopes (and the despair) that impelled it. He
Kenny'scollectionof philosophicalessays is
adds that "pluralism"
precludedSorelfrom of- intendedto show that the concepts of intenferingany unified or systematicexpositionof tion, voluntariness,and purposeplay a crucial
his thinking(pp. 176-77). Pluralismis not in- role in legal and politicalissues of broad and
herentlyunsystematic.If Sorelhad held that a generalinterest.The nineessaysin thisvolume
single set of philosophicalprinciplesdictated fall into two categories:philosophy and law,
identical conclusions in diverse fields-Jenand philosophyand war. An epilogueconsists
nings speaks of "methodological,scientific, of one essay on academicfreedom.
epistemologicaland ethicalpluralism"(pp. 12,
Part 1, on the philosophy of law, contains
15)-then he would have been a systematizer four papers. The first two, "Direct and
indeed. However, Jennings does not take Oblique Intentionand Malice Aforethought"
To resurrecta classicwork requiresthatone be
awareof what has gone on sinceits demise.To
attempt a theoreticaladvance upon a significant work without an explorationinto the difficulties and biases of that work's theoretical
framework, particularlywithin an area so
ideologicalin its originsand implicationsas the
authoritarianliteratureis, assuresthat the current work will be but a small contribution.
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